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Introduction
‘Foreigners always worry about the big banquet 
and the money. Who worries about how to make it 
all work…?’ (Chinese education manager)
One of the largest areas of Sino-foreign collaboration 
remains the area of education where over 10,000 alli-
ances have been formed between Chinese and for-
eign universities since 1978. Research has tended to 
focus on issues of culture, organisation, management 
and even the funding of alliances – and the focus has 
tended to be on alliance behaviour over a three to five 
year period. What has not been researched in as much 
detail is how alliance partner managers (Chinese and 
foreign) behave over a shorter period of time, particu-
larly during the crucial start up phase of an alliance. 
This study identifies a series of 16 stages alliances went 
through and it was not an easy process. 
Literature review
The topic of higher education alliances between Chi-
nese and foreign universities has been studied in detail 
by a variety of authors since the late 1970s, when the 
pace and rate of alliance began to speed up. Hayhoe’s 
studies (1989, 1996) remain perhaps the best known. 
She considered alliances from the perspective of com-
parative education and evaluated some of the issues, 
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challenges and benefits of alliances for the two sides. 
She did not look at any given period of time, however, 
focussing instead on the alliances as a whole. At that 
time, the focus was still rather generic and focussed 
on frameworks and key, overriding issues and associ-
ated factors. 
Alliances were divided into four categories by Willis 
(2001), who also considered other aspects of their 
structure, role, focus and rationale (2001 a,b,c; 2002 
a,b,c ). Again, however, this research took a ‘whole of 
alliance view’.  A different perspective was undertaken 
by Street (1992), Johnston (1996), Ross (1993), and Ross 
and Liu (1998), who considered some of the complexi-
ties of delivering courses and programmes in China 
(often emphasising issues of culture and the tensions 
faced by a foreigner in China), while Pepper (1996), 
considered university change and restructure in China, 
both noting, in passing, that this restructure provided a 
degree of impetus for international collaboration. 
Again, the focus was on the larger picture rather 
than issues of detail.  A number of Chinese authors 
(Deng, 1994; Jiang, 1995; Jing, 1995; Fang, 1996; Kok, 
1996; Cui, 1997; Guo, 1997 and 1998; Huang, 1997; Dai, 
2001), considered various aspects of collaboration and 
education change and restructure in China – but few 
(apart from Hayhoe’s seminal studies), were able to 
chart trends in alliance activities, structure, and behav-
iour, across the short term.  Others tended to focus on 
the macro and micro trends which helped to shape 
the environment in which educational activities were 
undertaken over time in China. 
Studies, for example by Baird, Lyles, Li and Wharton 
(1991), Child (1994), Carey and Zou (1995), Canyon 
(1997), Fuxin and Gronin (1997), Benewick and Win-
grove (1998), and Bray (1998) – help to set the frame-
work and indeed background for the present study, 
by considering a range of factors and issues relevant 
to the formation and management of joint ventures 
in a Sino foreign context.   Studies by Yau (1988), Xin 
(1996), Wong (1998), Wong and Leung (2001), Wong 
and Slater (2002), and Molinsky (2007) tended to con-
sider specific cultural aspects and issues considered 
to be germane to ‘doing business in China’, and these 
studies together with some others which consider 
similar issues in specific industry situations (such as 
Wong, Luk and Li, 2005) help to provide some of the 
background for possible cultural issues which seem to 
impact on foreign activity in China. 
By the mid part of the current decade, a number of 
studies had appeared (i.e. Willis, 2006) which tended 
to focus on more specific aspects and issues of col-
laboration.  These studies remain somewhat holistic in 
their viewpoint and aim. 
Method
Using a depth interview qualitative process as the basis 
for this study, research was undertaken in the follow-
ing locations: Nanjing, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Wuxi, Beijing, 
Guangzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai.
In each city, a university joint venture involving a 
Chinese and foreign partner was investigated. Non-
Chinese partners came from the USA, Australia, Canada, 
and countries in Europe. Each alliance had been oper-
ating for a minimum of four years. 
The process used was to ask each manager (individ-
ually and never in a group) to discuss, in an open, non-
directed, and unstructured manner, how the first two 
years of the alliance had gone, from their own perspec-
tive and view.  This process was used to avoid ‘leading’ 
respondents and to enable them to reflect on the first 
two years of the alliance in their own way, according 
to their own ideas and in their own time. 
The term ‘First two years’ was explained to be from 
the time they held their first significant meeting with 
the foreign (or Chinese) partner. Issues explored were 
as identified by respondents and they included issues 
of culture, structure, organisation, perception and dis-
tance. These issues gradually started to merge into an 
integrated series of steps. Data were collected over 
three years. 
Findings
These were the steps. 
Step 1: Testing the water on both sides. 
During this stage the two sides behaved in a tentative, 
formalised, and almost ritualistic manner. They talked 
in general terms, did not commit themselves to much 
at all, and often sat in formal meetings talking around 
topics and issues in a somewhat guarded and formal 
manner.  This was a stage where the two sides would 
sound each other out – but in a very careful and tenta-
tive manner.  
It was almost ritualised. Each side would speak from 
its own objectives and position. Each would state its 
own ideas and views but in a general and unspecific 
manner.  The Chinese would wonder,  ‘can the foreign-
ers be trusted at all?’ and ‘do they have any real level 
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of interest sincerity, commitment and honesty?’, while 
the foreigners tended to wonder whether there was 
any real business opportunity or substantial chance of 
developing and delivering programmes. The Chinese 
tended to worry about more holistic issues than the 
foreigners who tended to be rather more concerned 
about options and opportunities for possible collabo-
ration in a structured business sense.  This was a stage 
of initial attitude formation – only. 
Step 2: Taking the first tentative steps 
During this stage the two sides would take the first 
very tentative steps towards collaboration. These 
steps could include some social activities (perhaps a 
dinner, a cultural performance or a visit), or possible 
activities where there could be some initial discussion 
about potential programmes and activities and other 
initiatives.  
Discussions would be rather general at this stage 
but some ideas would start to emerge which were of 
a more specific nature than in the first step. For exam-
ple, people might talk about the idea of an exchange or 
study abroad programme. They might talk about their 
experiences with certain programmes and activities. 
The ideas would certainly be rather vague at this stage 
but there would be a sense that the discussion table, if 
one can put it this way, now had something tangible on 
it.   A perception of ‘would, could, possibly, actually do 
something together’ would start to emerge. However, 
any ideas (and associated feelings and perceptions) 
would be somewhat circumspect, carefully worded 
and one would not ‘give away anything of value’ to the 
other side at this very tentative stage.
 This was a time of suggesting and waiting: listening 
and responding, talking about ideas and committing 
some small aspects of oneself or one’s organisation. 
However, there was also a sense of gathering momen-
tum. But it was very early days.  The view was: ‘we feel 
that we have something of value to offer each other 
but we are not sure...’ 
Step 3: Thinking and acting about each other 
Respondents noted that it was around this stage that 
they would start to think rather more assertively or 
actively about each other than they had done in the 
first two steps of the developing alliance. They would 
wonder: could we really do business together, would 
this work? Could I see this being a successful part-
nership? What do I actually think about this?  Is there 
potential here or not? A sense of affective and cogni-
tive reflection would take place at this juncture and 
people would start to consider various aspects of a 
possible alliance in terms of people, emotions and pos-
sible programmes.  
It was a time for initial reflection, testing views 
and perceptions and thinking in terms of resources 
and structure. These thoughts were undertaken in 
private with one’s peers, and quite often away from 
the negotiating venue, such as a Chinese or foreign 
university campus. One also had to consider how to 
act in future (which could be tomorrow or in a few 
minutes) and what one wanted from the alliance (if 
it could be developed) and the associated relation-
ships. Suddenly, one felt drawn into a higher level of 
both introspection and discernible commitment. As 
one said, ‘I felt that there was a certain sense of pace 
and action, but it was still rather unclear where we 
were going!’ 
Step 4: Setting up some initial activities – testing 
the water. 
It was only now that the two sides would start to 
consider undertaking a few initial and fairly basic 
activities. These initial activities would usually be 
small, short term, basic and not particularly demand-
ing, yet in a symbolic manner they were actually very 
important.  
They would test the ability of the two sides to work 
together at a human and affective level and would also 
determine whether they were able to collaborate on an 
activity or range of activities which had some discern-
ible benefit. A small core group would now emerge to 
be the champions of the alliance. This group had to be 
formed to progress any further. 
Step 5: Worrying to ourselves about the 
programme and about each side
The very act of setting up a few trial projects and form-
ing an integrated core group tended to raise problems, 
tensions and issues because people on both sides 
now had to start to commit – money, time and them-
selves.  The alliance would now go through a period 
of – almost – rethinking, reconfiguration, worry and 
tension. Some might not have expected this situation 
at this time: but it was there. 
Step 6: Taking stronger steps: bolder 
programmes and new initiatives 
By now, it had been decided to take a few bold steps 
and develop and implement some more  expansive alli-
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ance activities and programmes which could be of a 
range of types:
Larger activities of a single type (such as a bigger •	
exchange programme, perhaps based on an initial 
exploratory programme).
A range of activities and programmes which them-•	
selves could be divided into two types:  activities 
undertaken just in China or activities undertaken 
both in China and abroad.
Activities which had a defined time period and activ-•	
ities which were perceived to be possibly ongoing.
Programmes which were of varying levels of scale – •	
ranging from small to large. 
In regard to these options, 
a range of approaches was 
also possible for implemen-
tation: activities could be 
expanded and built up over 
time or started at a large 
scale initially (this tended to depend on the level of 
empathy, and confidence expressed by the two sides). 
Large scale projects were often too hard to handle, a 
staggered step-by-step approach was usually better. 
One needed to be patient – this was not easy. 
Step 7: Taking stock
By now (and this could be part way through step six 
if the activities or projects were staggered) there was 
a need for a period of ‘taking stock’ in the alliance. 
Perhaps some programmes and activities had been 
underway for a reasonable period of time – and it 
was now time to review the programmes, activities 
and indeed relationships amongst core staff within 
the alliance. 
The views of key staff from each side needed to be 
evaluated and considered as did the views and ideas of 
outer core staff. Programmes were often changed and 
reconfigured at this juncture. New programmes were 
sometimes added to supplement those already planned 
and some programmes might be discontinued. 
Step 8: Early problems and hiccups 
During  the roll out of programmes (if a staggered proc-
ess was used as discussed in step six) or at any time in 
the conduct of a major set of projects and activities, 
problems would occur constantly: and some were:  
Where initial programmes and activities had met •	
with teething problems (this happened in almost all 
cases, respondents noted) – usually it was an issue 
of the two sides simply underestimating the level of 
organisational complexity in developing and deliver-
ing a programme in China.
Where there were problems with expectations on •	
one or both sides (often where programmes had 
been rolled out too slowly or even too fast).
Where there was concern about how to balance  (or •	
even identify) programme delivery in China vis á vis 
back in the home university (i.e. in Canada or Aus-
tralia) and on what basis and criteria.
Where key people started to argue amongst them-•	
selves (on one side or the other or on both sides), 
and with stakeholders in parent universities and so 
on (often on the basis of problems with activities, 
programmes, and expecta-
tions or simply the level 
of complexity required to 
deliver projects in China.
Where initial enthusi-•	
asm started to wane to be 
replaced by a sense that the delivery of activities 
and the project itself was simply going to be hard 
work not always enhanced by positive cross cultural 
encounters.   
By now one needed to be realistic: an alliance was 
something of a volatile creature. It would never quite 
settle. 
Step 9: Time to develop systems and processes 
By now (and, again this could be part way through 
step six or at the end – or at any point of time within 
a defined period of a programme) there was a signifi-
cant recognition that behind the various programmes 
and activities was a need for the establishment of far 
more elaborate systems and processes which would 
provide the real frameworks for activities and projects 
which had often been delivered, thus far, in a relatively 
haphazard manner, partly on the basis of enthusiasm 
and trust and partly because the two sides tended to 
underestimate the level of detailed planning required 
to manage and deliver a programme successfully in 
China. Both sides now needed (and wanted) structure, 
processes, organisation. These needed somehow to 
wed home-based processes (e.g. in Australia) with Chi-
nese reality, and this was hard.
Step 10: New initiatives – the start of a true and 
multifaceted alliance 
After the first round of initiatives and programmes 
discussed from step six, alliances tended to develop 
(and this could be as early as in the second year of 
[We] needed to be realistic: an alliance 
was something of a volatile creature. It 
would never quite settle. 
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the alliance) a range of revised, consolidated or new 
programmes which usually  grew out of earlier pro-
grammes which were more basic and initial in ori-
entation,  design and implementation. These new 
programmes tended to form the real backbone of 
a successful alliance. Whereas an initial programme 
might have been, for example, to send some students 
to Australia, almost as a trial or a test, now, the two sides 
would start to develop a more complex study abroad 
programme with more depth and rigour.  These pro-
grammes would have far more complexity, detail and 
even commitment behind them. 
If the various initial programmes discussed in step 
six had been implemented in a sequential manner it 
was not unusual, in a larger alliance (where there were 
a range of programmes and activities) to observe new, 
often consolidated activities, being implemented side 
by side with the gradual roll out of initial programmes 
as follows:
Figure 1: Staggered approach
Often in an alliance new initial, trial activities could 
therefore be observed over a course of time while 
consolidated, new and more solid activities were also 
launched at key points in the alliance. 
On the other hand in some alliances the situation 
was more like this – a time based approach:
Figure 2: Time based approach 
(And so on). 
Either way, the point is that over time, successful alli-
ances would gradually develop more complete, com-
plex, sustainable and time proven programmes and 
activities which would provide the basis for a more 
mature and fully developed alliance. This sense of ini-
tial and longer-term orientation and design was a key 
aspect of alliances in China. 
Step 11:  Stepping forwards and backwards – 
taking the slow dance towards integration…
By now, the alliance had reached the stage whereby a 
range of activities had been underway for some period 
of time. Some programmes were still usually being tri-
alled while others had been consolidated and estab-
lished as core offerings of the alliance. If all was going 
well, there was now a sense on both sides that the alli-
ance could actually work in the longer term. As one 
said: ‘we had – perhaps for the first time – a sense of 
depth, of real commitment and of tangibility in terms 
of our activities and projects’. 
In a sense, the two sides could now take stock, 
rethink their respective and integrated positions and 
think about the future. It was as if the core business 
was now underway to the point where issues of strat-
egy and longer-term orientation could now be con-
sidered.  It was by about this time that the two sides 
would often reflect on the complexities and stresses of 
establishing and operationalising a joint venture pro-
gramme. There was a sense of maturation. 
Step 12: Melding ideas, actions, plans and 
practicalities 
Now, at last, it was time to ‘get serious’ about the longer 
term strategic objectives of the alliance, and during this 
stage new and often larger plans were laid down by 
the two sides for the longer term.  A number of options 
now emerged: 
To maintain the alliance in its original format and •	
focus (perhaps sharp, small, limited and strategic) – 
but to now deepen this sharp, narrow focus.
To extend the alliance into additional areas of activ-•	
ity as a process of diversity.
To expand the alliance into new locations (often •	
replicating programmes across various locations to 
secure additional income).
To reconfigure the alliance into various streams of •	
activities (i.e. basic programmes, high value activi-
ties, brand development initiatives) and so on to 
develop a greater sense of maturity and complexity 
using any or a combination of the above strategies.  
New initiative (either 
brand new or emerg-
ing out of initial 
activities).
Initial run of 
activities and 
programmes 
- introduced 
in a group.
New programmes (say 
in year two) emerging 
out of initial run pro-
grammes or separate. 
New programmes (say 
in year two) emerging 
out of initial run pro-
grammes or separate. 
Staggered initial run 
programmes and 
activities – imple-
mented over time.
Ti
m
e 
O
ri
en
ta
tio
n
A U S T R A L I A N  U N I V E R S I T I E S ’  R E V I E W
vol. 51, no. 1, 200952   Not quite like a honeymoon, Mike Willis & Rowan Kennedy
It was time to consider all of these approaches in 
order to move the alliance from an initial and rather 
basic structure encompassing a range of initial and 
core activities, to a new plane of solidity, depth and 
strength. If this review and consolidation did not take 
place, all respondents agreed that the alliance would 
fail – it would remain somehow tentative, elusive, basic 
and lacking in real integrity and strength.  There had to 
be this period of real strategic consolidation and long 
term planning. It was now that the mists and clouds 
cleared: and if they did not the alliance would falter. 
Step 13: Our first big problems  
Increased commitment, however, tends to come at a 
price. The more the two sides, and particularly the Chi-
nese, developed, expanded and strengthened the alli-
ance (in terms of activities and programmes but also 
at the human relationship level), the greater the level 
of commitment and sense that there was much to gain 
but also much to lose. 
When the alliance was simply testing a few pro-
grammes or running a basic exchange or similar pro-
gramme, in a sense no one was too worried. But now 
the situation was rather different; now there were real 
feelings or perceptions that the stakes were higher, the 
issue of face was more critical and people had now 
started to commit at a far more personal and organi-
sational level.  Now quite serious tensions developed 
because the alliance was more serious. It was a difficult 
time. One had to be careful. As one said: ‘it was kind of 
strange – we had come this far and then we felt that it 
was all in danger. It was almost as if the more serious 
we got, the more we worried about it all!’ 
Step 14: Do we have an alliance yet? 
By now, the two sides (or at least the core inner staff 
with well-developed relationships and a sense of genu-
ine commitment to the alliance) could start to reflect 
and ponder whether they did, at last, have a well-devel-
oped, mature and established alliance.  Now they could 
think that there could be a serious long term future 
for their alliance, if all had gone well. This includes 
the negotiation about the problems and issues, and 
the stresses associated with an alliance are part of the 
maturing process. 
What they now also could start to think about was 
the observation that an alliance would always be about 
change, problems, tensions, resolution, and innovation 
and would probably never be particularly stable or 
easy.  This was the start of a real alliance. 
Step 15: Growing pains – at home, abroad, with 
work, and with colleagues 
By about now it had become evident to respondents 
that an alliance was always a thing of change, stress, 
strain and tension.  These strains were structural in 
nature but also cross-cultural and, in addition, a result 
of the range and scope of stakeholders. There were 
always (daily) problems of culture, organisation, activi-
ties, processes, confusion and money. 
Things never settled: this was one of the secrets of 
success: to realise this fact, even if one had by now 
developed a range of viable activities and indeed rela-
tionships.  As the alliance grew, matured, developed 
and waxed and waned there were always problems, 
tensions and issues. This was reality.  And this was part 
of success. 
Step 16: We can’t see over the mountain but at 
least we can climb it together 
By about the end of the second year, respondents in 
this cohort felt that they had developed the basis for 
a true, longer term alliance. In a way, this was the true 
start of something longer, real and tangible.  By now, 
there was an expectation that:
The two sides had developed a reasonably mature •	
and empathetic set of relationships amongst core 
staff which would provide the basis for ongoing and 
continued alliance success.
Organisational details including plans, processes, •	
staffing, roles, expectations and objectives had been 
put into place to provide the alliance with a kind of 
fundamental structural basis for ongoing activity.
Expectations had started to mature in the sense that •	
the two sides now had an understanding of how com-
plex it was to manage a cross cultural alliance, and 
they had also trialled, developed and implemented a 
range of activities and projects which would start to 
form the core of an alliance over the longer term.
There was now some history between the two •	
sides (albeit only over a period of up to two years), 
but this did help to provide a sense of the past, the 
present and the future. That is, there was  a growing 
sense of commitment to the longer term based on 
the fact that the alliance had now lasted for up to 
two years or so.
There was a growing sense of being able to treat •	
the alliance as a genuine and real entity of its own 
rather than just a convenient linking of forces from 
two very different sides for the sake of a few pro-
grammes, activities and trials.
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Use of the steps and the associated issues and 
findings
The paper indicated that there were many steps to 
forge an alliance over the first two years and manag-
ers on both sides (Chinese and foreign) need to recog-
nise that each step is part of the process of building a 
valuable and genuine alliance.  There was no quick and 
easy way to shortcut the process.  It was only by the 
end of year two that the alliance had reached a stage of 
some kind of viability. This is a process which requires 
time, patience, negotiation, trial and error, and above all 
– commitment. The idea that one can sign an alliance, 
settle it in and then expect no problems is a myth. This 
study shows that even in the first two years the proc-
ess is at once volatile and sequential. This is a volatile 
world. There is no escaping this. 
In essence, and to sum up, it is possible to glean from 
the various stages a sense of four major periods within 
the formation of an alliance: 
Tentative beginnings: formal, home based (where 1. 
the two sides tended to view issues and options 
almost solely from their home base world – that is 
from a Chinese or foreign perspective), uncommit-
ted, tentative and naïve. 
Early steps: a few activities undertaken, enthusias-2. 
tic, committed (to a degree) – but naïve. This was 
a stage of enthusiastic but somewhat superficial 
engagement on both sides. It was rather like a ‘fools 
gold’ alliance stage – far from the real thing!    
Reassessment: where the two sides tended to start 3. 
to realise that an alliance was a complex activity 
involving a range of aspects and dimensions. This 
was a period of introspection, and what tended to 
emerge was a new and deeper level of recognition, 
understanding and, indeed, affective and cognitive 
awareness of what it was really going to take to 
make an alliance work. 
Realism: where the two sides showed a new level of 4. 
recognition about the issues, problems, challenges 
and opportunities embodied in an educational alli-
ance. It was at this stage, and only at this stage, that 
the two sides could start to move their alliance to 
a new and higher level of engagement.  What had 
changed, in a word, was commitment: a sense of 
what it would really take to make an alliance viable 
and successful in a world of cross cultural and 
organisational complexity – let alone, in regard to 
the specific aspects of educational delivery.  What 
had also changed (to a degree) was a sense of ‘us’ 
rather than ‘us and them’ – that is: a recognition that 
the whole of the alliance was indeed rather more 
than just the sum of the individual parts for two 
very different partners. It was now, and only now, 
that the alliance had a platform which could start 
to provide the basis for some kind of longer-term 
success. What was sad was that so many alliances 
never even reached this platform. 
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